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Abstract
Libra was presented as a cryptocurrency on June 18, 2019 by Facebook.
On the same day, Facebook announced plans for Calibra, a subsidiary in
charge of the development of an electronic wallet and financial services.
In view of the primary risk of sovereignty posed by the creation of Libra,
regulators and Central Banks quickly took very clear positions against the
project and expressed a lot of questions focusing on regulation aspects and
national sovereignty.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a holistic analysis of the
project encompassing several aspects of its implementation and the issues
it raises. We address a set of questions that are part of the cryptocurrency
environment and blockchain technology that support the Libra project.
We describe the governance of the project based on two levels, one for
the Association and the other for the Libra Blockchain. We identify the
main risks considering at the same time political, financial, economic,
technological and ethical risks. We emphasize the difficulty to regulate
such a project as it will depend on several countries whose legislations
are very different. Finally, the future of this kind of projects is discussed
through the emergence of Central Bank Digital Currencies.
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1 Introduction
Libra was presented as a cryptocurrency on June 18, 2019 by Facebook. On the
same day, Facebook announced plans for Calibra, a subsidiary in charge of the
development of an electronic wallet and financial services.
To avoid a regulatory confusion around this project, the different banking
and financial institutions, along with public actors, quickly reacted and created
several task forces. They also asked Facebook to work with the appropriate
regulatory authorities. Thus, as the host of the G7 and the G7 Finance Ministers
meeting of Chantilly 1, France put a task force in place.2
Other institutions such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the European
Banking Authority (EBA), Central Banks3, the Financial Stability Board
(FSB), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) also reacted among others.
As early as July, the American Senate Committee asked David Marcus (CEO of
Calibra) to suspend his project, while Singapore is concerned 4 and India says
it is not comfortable with the project 5.
While the Libra Association sought an authorization in Switzerland from
FINMA for Libra to be used as a means of payment, Bruno Le Maire, the French
Minister of the Economy, announced on September 11, 2019, that “allowing the
development of Libra on European soil” is out of the question. In his view,
there are three issues at stake with the initiative of the social network: (1) the
“monetary sovereignty of States”, (2) the fight against the illicit uses of money
and finally (3) financial stability and risks for individuals and businesses.6.
In view of the primary risk of sovereignty posed by the creation of Libra,
the Central Banks quickly took very clear positions. France and Germany have
declared wanting to ban Libra7. Head of the People’s Bank of China’s (PBoC)
Research Bureau Wang Xin said that in the event of a massive adoption of
1https://www.economie.gouv.fr/G7-finance-en
2https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-crypto-france/france-creates-g7-
cryptocurrency-task-force-as-facebooks-libra-unsettles-governments-idUSKCN1TM0SO
The goal of this task force is to create a regulatory frame encompassing crypto assets like
Libra: drawing the first conclusions from the status report of the G7 working group to better
assess the opportunities as but also the risks associated with this class of assets, particularly
in terms of financial stability, transmission of monetary policy, consumer protection, money
laundering and terrorist financing.
3The European Central Bank, headed by Benoit Coeure´, released a report on stable wedges
at the end of 2019 (crypto currencies pegged to currencies or financial assets, see Section 2).
4www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/Project-
Ubin.aspx
5https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/facebook-may-abort-libra-
launch-in-india/articleshow/69867426.cms
6hhttps://www.businesstimes.com.sg/banking-finance/g-7-countries-seeking-
common-stance-on-facebooks-libra
7https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cryptocurrency-france-german/
france-and-germany-agree-to-block-facebooks-libra-idUSKCN1VY1XU
https://journalducoin.com/altcoins/reaction-libra-chine-accelere-projets-
cryptomonnaie/
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Libra, this new currency would have the potential to profoundly alter monetary
balances, financial stability and even the international economic system8. In
his statement, he indicated the possible adverse effects of this “made in USA”
stablecoin. According to him, it is difficult to imagine that a digital currency
backed by the dollar (the Libra) is totally equivalent and as powerful as a
sovereign currency (the dollar itself), because “there is only one boss, namely
the US dollar and the United States”. At the same time, we learned that China
was going to issue a digital government currency (see Section 2 on CBDCs).
Other countries have also announced their intention to create their own digital
currency: Iran plans to create a currency indexed on the Rial, Venezuela
launched the Petro at the beginning of 2018 indexed on the country’s reserve of
oil, with 1 Petro having the price a barrel of oil, Russia talks about creating a
currency indexed on oil9, Marshall Islands are on the verge of issuing a digital
asset after having adopted a law on February 26, 201810, etc.
Nevertheless, at the same time, we can see that the Libra project is supported
by powerful Silicon Valley groups. Indeed, at the date of September 16, 2019,
28 entities accepted to support the launch of Libra, 25 of them investing 10
million dollars each (the 3 NGOs are exempted). Those entities include 6
payment services, 7 technology firms and marketplaces, 2 telecommunication
firms, 4 Blockchain companies, 5 venture capital firms, 1 research center and 3
NGO. It is to be noted that 18 of those organizations are US-based and only 6
are European (including 2 UK firms). On October 4, 2019, Paypal announced
their withdrawal from the project11. On October 11, 2019, Visa, Mastercard,
Stripe, eBay and Mercado Pago followed12. Thus, every major US payment
processor has exited the association and the only remaining payment provider
is PayU, a Netherlands-based company. On October 14, 2019, the internet
company Booking left, just before the official launch of the Libra Association
in Geneva with 21 founding members out of the original 28.13
Over the few months since the original announcement, the Libra project
has already undergone some changes. For example, an early version14 of a
document describing the Libra Association [2] described an Investment Token,
a security sold to early investors like the founding members of the Association
that entitles their holder to voting rights and interests earned on the collateral.
8https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3017716/facebooks-libra-
forcing-china-step-plans-its-own
9https://www.ccn.com/russia-regulate-cryptop-with-a-keen-eye-on-oil-backed-
digital-currency/
10https://sov.foundation/
11https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/4/20899310/facebook-libra-paypal-online-
currency-payment-system-cryptocurrency
12https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/11/20910330/mastercard-stripe-ebay-facebook-
libra-association-withdrawal-cryptocurrency
13https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/facebook-forms-its-cryptocurrency-council-
after-key-backers-drop-out.html
14https://web.archive.org/web/20190618210315/https://libra.org/en-US/wp-
content/uploads/sites/23/2019/06/TheLibraAssociation_en_US-1.pdf
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In the current version of the document, all references to this Investment Token
have disappeared, mentioning only the membership to the Association as a
mechanism of governance.
This announced objective of the Libra project is financial inclusion, in order
to make up for the lack of Central Banks in certain regions of the world.
Libra proposes the creation of a currency allowing commercial transactions
on different platforms in response to the demand of the unbanked or poorly
banked. It seems difficult to deal only with the economic, or financial or political
approach without asking the question of the technological environment that
largely determines the project.
While there is an explosion of positions on the Libra project, mainly focused
on aspects of regulation and national sovereignty, few documents analyze this
phenomenon globally. We only see short statements, either positive, dubious, or
anxiety inducing based on very specific aspects of the project. However, as we
demonstrate in this paper, Libra cannot be restrictively viewed as a new system
of money creation and transfers.
The purpose of our paper is to provide a holistic analysis of the project to
encompass several aspects of its implementation and the issues it raises. In this
prospective work, we wish to address a set of questions that are part of the
cryptocurrency environment and blockchain technology that support the Libra
project. We are interested in identifying the main risks associated to this project
in its preliminary phase. The questions we are interested in are: (i) What is
Libra? Currency, crypto-asset, stable coin, settlement coin? (ii) Why are stable
coins interesting and innovative: can they strengthen financial stability? (iii)
What is new in the architecture of Libra? (iv) What are the risks of this project?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some definitions
and analyze the concept of stable coins and CBDC. We propose a first definition
of Libra in the light of these notions. In Section 3 we analyze the technology
behind the Libra project. Section 4 is devoted to regulatory matters. In Section
5 we analyze the different risks associated with this project and we conclude in
Section 6.
2 Definitions/framework
2.1 Currency, monetary system, cryptocurrency
In this section, we introduce the notions of money, cryptocurrency and stable
coins. These different reminders allow us to analyze what could be the status
of Libra currency.
A currency is defined by three functions: (i) unit of account for economic
calculation or accounting, (ii) reserve of value and (iii) intermediary of
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the exchanges (ability to extinguish debts and obligations). A currency is
characterized by the trust of its users in the persistence of its value and ability
to serve as a means of exchange. It therefore has social, political, psychological,
legal and economic dimensions. In times of unrest and loss of confidence, new
currencies can appear.
The international monetary system is based on methods allowing the
exchange of goods, debts and services between countries using different
currencies. This system has often been subject to evolution. The crisis of
1929, considered responsible for the magnitude and duration of the depression,
led to international cooperation, affirmed by the Bretton Woods agreements,
introducing a fixed but adjustable exchange rate system, regulated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The abandonment of gold convertibility
of the dollar in 1971 (Jamaica Agreement) led to a less regulated system of
floating exchange rates. In 2008, the massive financial crisis that was observed
has necessitated the organization of a more stable and regulated international
monetary system. The Basel III agreements15 are one of the answers to
make this system more stable. It is interesting to note that it was at this
date that Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym) [26] published the whitepaper
that created Bitcoin and propagated the development of other crypto-assets
based on a decentralized system without any trusted party. At that time,
they believed that such an alternative financial system is the best way to
counter the concentration of power and control in the too-big-to-fail financial
institutions [12].
Cryptocurrency (or crypto-asset) describes digital currencies that use
cryptography to secure their payment networks and transactions in a
decentralized way. Cryptography is a discipline dedicated to the protection
of messages (confidentiality, authenticity, integrity) through the use of keys.
This technique dates back to antiquity and was long considered an art and it
was not until the 20th century that it became a science and the massive use of
computers democratized its use.
This process ensures that the sender is the author of the message. Any
digital currency based on a blockchain – a public ledger that records all
transactions – which uses cryptography to encrypt recordings can be referred to
as cryptocurrency. Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Dash, Monero, and others fall
under the category of cryptocurrencies. Other digital currencies allow secure,
fast and low cost transactions and use blockchain technology, for example
Ripple (XPR), but in this case, even if the protocol allows a decentralized
management of the issue and associated transactions to this currency, there
are only a few actors (validators), chosen by the company Ripple, who are
authorized to operate on the network. Thus, Ripple, despite being based
on blockchain technology, is not decentralized and is governed by a private
blockchain. Ripple could be seen as a “simplified” representation of Libra in
his governance but not in the technological approach as Libra does not create
15https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm
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blocks to secure transactions (See Section 3).
Currently, all crypto currencies are characterized by a high volatility
relatively to their liquidity. This property that is interesting for the speculators
makes their economic utility rather weak because economic actors are not
interested in a currency that is too volatile. This is the reason why we have
seen the introduction of the concept of stable coins in the cryptocurrencies
universe since 2014.
In this paper, we designate by crypto-currency any digital currency that is
secured by a blockchain-related protocol, public and totally decentralized type
like Bitcoin, or private type or consortium like Ripple for example. In Appendix
A, we give more information about these two concepts of blockchains, private
or public, see also [15,20,21,23].
2.2 Stable coins
The principal idea for creating a stable currency is to use the Quantity Theory
of Money (QTM) [19] to determine when and how to print and destroy money.
First, the notion of a currency’s value relative to some ideal stable value must
preexist. This value is most commonly specified by a Consumer Price Index
(CPI), though most existing stable coins have chosen the USD as their measure
of stable value. This choice of index of stable value is called the peg. QTM is
based on the relevant equation relating the price P and the quantity of money
M : PM = constant, which is derived from the classical equation of exchange.
Thus, to avoid the instability observed with other crypto currencies, Libra
decides to create a reserve. In this project, the Libra reserve is composed of
currencies equal to the entrance fees of the validators. The reserve is held in
a basket of currencies, the repartition of which is known, and in principle the
maintenance of the reserve is not more than the profit that can be achieved in
the arbitrage [11]. Part of the profits will be used by the Association, and the
rest will be paid to investors (Libra is a non-profit organization).
Any crypto-currency pegged to either a fiat currency or some kind of
government-backed security (like a bond) counts as a stable coin. The idea
is that this crypto-currency will be more stable or less volatile. Asset-backed
cryptocurrencies are not necessarily centralised, since there may be a network
of decentralized vaults and commodity holders, rather than a controlling
centralised body. The advantages of asset-backed cryptocurrencies are that
coins are stabilized by assets that fluctuate outside of the cryptocurrency space
reducing financial risk. Traditional crypto-currencies (Bitcoin, Ether, altcoins
and others) are highly intercorrelated, so that cryptocurrency holders cannot
escape global price falls without exiting the market of cryptocurrencies or
taking refuge in asset-backed stablecoins. Furthermore, assuming that they are
managed in good faith and have a mechanism for redeeming the assets backing
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them, asset-backed coins are unlikely to drop below the value of the underlying
physical asset, thank to arbitrage.
We can distinguish several classes of stable coins even if the terminology is
not fixed yet16.
• Fiat-Collateralized stable coins. The underlying model implies that
the organization issuing a stablecoin holds a bank account containing the
value of the issued tokens in fiat money. Thus, the organization can issue
stable securities with a 1:1 ratio relative to its reserve in fiat currencies like
the dollar or the euro, or other currencies. This model is fairly centralized
knowing that it is the same entity who owns the assets represented. For
example, the Tether currency is backed by the dollar (1: 1). Nevertheless,
this one is quite controversial because it is impossible to verify if its reserve
exists and if we are not in the presence of a Ponzi scheme.
The system related to Tether has evolved since they changed the backing
to include loans to affiliate companies in March 2019. There are other
crypto currencies backed by a single currency: USDCoin, Paxos, Gemini,
Stably, ONRAMP, TrustUSD are all backed by the US dollar, Stasis is
backed by the Euro, HKDK by the Hong Kong dollar, KRwb by the
South Korean won [10]. The advantage of these crypto currencies is that
the price is stable and more resistant to the risks associated with the use
of crypto currencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. The disadvantage is that
it is a centralized system, the same actor controls the stablecoin and the
reserve. For a stable coin to be attractive, it is important for the reserve to
be publicly known and for the governance mechanism to be well defined.
For example, Paxos Standard is a stablecoin whose US dollar reserve is
held in various US banks. Despite the amount of the reserve in US dollars
having been attested by independent auditors, the banks are not known.
Note that JPMorgan Chase & Co. has officially become the first US
bank to launch its own digital token representing a fiat currency
(June 2019). The bank has announced the creation of JPM Coin, a
blockchain-based technology that will facilitate the transfer of payments
between institutional clients. The coin is backed by the US dollar with
a 1:1 exchange ratio. For the bank, this JPM Coin is essentially a tool
to help with the instantaneous transfer of payments between JPMorgan’s
clients, and the bank has indicated its plans to use JPM Coin for additional
currencies as well in the future.
• Crypto-Collateralized stable coins. In this model, the stablecoin
is supported by other crypto-currencies. The question of volatility is
still present but the system allows collateralization by absorbing price
variations. Taking the example of the stablecoin Dai created by Markerdao
16A recent ECB paper [9] proposes a possible classification. Another classification is
proposed in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stablecoin, see also [10,13].
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and supported by the Ethereum, its principle is as follows: When Dais are
generated, a smart contract is created and locks an amount in Ethers,
a system that wants to be immutable. However, a major problem
undermines this model: if the price of cryptocurrency used collapses, the
certificates of issue could become ’sub-collateralized’, which could then
destabilize the price of the deposit. The stability of this cryptocurrency
therefore depends on the health of another virtual currency. The
advantages are that the system is decentralized, the liquidation can be
faster and there is more transparency.
• Commodity-backed stable coins. Stablecoins backed by commodities
such as precious metals (gold, silver etc.) are much less likely to be inflated
than fiat backed stablecoins. It is harder to mine gold or silver than it is to
create money “out of thin air”. The main characteristics of these backed
stablecoins are: (i) their value is fixed to one or more commodities and
redeemable for such (more or less) on demand, (ii) there is a promise to
pay, by unregulated individuals, agorist firms, or even regulated financial
institutions. For example, Digix Gold is a currency backed by gold (1
gram of gold for 1 DGX), while PAXG is backed by one fine troy ounce
(1 oz t ≈ 31.1 g) of a 400 oz London Good Delivery gold bar, held in
custody by the Paxos Trust Company. The questions around these stable
crypto currencies are the following: (i) Does the amount of commodity
used to back the stablecoin reflect the circulating supply of the stablecoin?
(ii) Can holders of commodity-backed stablecoins redeem their stablecoins
at the conversion rate to take possession of real assets? Another main
point is that the cost of maintaining the stability of the stablecoin is the
cost of storing and protecting the commodity backing.
• Algorithmic stable coins or Seignorage Shares. In this model, the
issued stablecoin is supported by nothing other than its value over a given
period. This model uses an algorithm that can be a smart contract. If
the total demand for the stablecoin increases or decreases, then it will
automatically change the number of chips in circulation to maintain a
stable price. This mechanism can be considered similar to how Central
Banks expand and contract monetary supply. They buy and sell fiscal
debt to stabilize purchasing power. The advantages of this approach are
that the system is decentralized and independent, adjustments are made
on-line and no collateral is needed to mint coins. Finally, the value is
controlled by supply and demand through algorithms that stabilize the
price. The disadvantage is that the coin cannot be liquidated in case of
problems. No such stable coins currently exists.
To conclude, the concept of stablecoin is at the experimental stage and
those in circulation are still prototypes. However, they could in the future
bring stability to the existing decentralized systems as means of decentralized
payment.
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2.3 The Libra stablecoin
Libra is a stable cryptocurrency but unlike most of the others, it is not
produced through a mining process. The transactions in Libra are done using
a novel cryptographic state replication protocol. Thus, Libra, whose exchanges
are based on a peer-to-peer system, is closer to a digital currency than to a
crypto-currency. Libra will be created (1) in exchange for fiat currencies (a
user buys Libra for fiat), (2) by investors (the more they encourage users to
use Libra, the more they receive bonuses).
Libra can be considered as a stable coin because it will be backed by
a basket of fiat currencies. In response to the German regulator Fabio De
Masi17, Facebook has communicated on September 23, 2019 the nature of the
composition of Libra currency basket which will include: dollar representing
50% of the basket, the euro for 18%, the yen with 14%, the pound with 11%
and finally a little Singapore dollars up to 7%, no Chinese yuan. This last
condition was indeed part of the requirements of the US Senate, especially
Senator Mark Warner who was the spokesman for the US position: out of
question that the Chinese national currency is part of the stablecoin currency
panel.
It is interesting to note that the stable coin Libra is not emitted for the
same reasons as the previous mentioned stable coins. Indeed, all the previous
fiat-collateralized cited stable coins are issued by “crypto-native” firms whose
roots are in the nascent sector. These stable coins have been created and used
for investors to hedge against spikes in bitcoin’s price, and as a means to trade
crypto-currencies without using dollars, and also for arbitrage opportunities.
However, Facebook is not a crypto-native firm.
The choice of Libra to build a stable coin lies on the objective to ensure
that the pegging mechanism works as intended, so that the Libra coin does
not undergo any crazy crypto pumps & dumps. Holders of Libra coin probably
won’t face any bigger risk than holding cash.
To attain this objective, the founders decided to create a reserve for
achieving value preservation, backing each coin with a set of stable and liquid
assets. The objective is to avoid speculative swings that are experienced by
existing crypto-currencies. The white paper [11] indicates that “the reserve
assets will be a collection of low-volatility assets, including cash and government
securities from stable and reputable central banks”.
It is important to note also that backed stable coins are subject to the same
volatility and risk associated with the backing asset. If the backed stablecoin is
backed in a decentralized manner, then they are relatively safe from predation,
but if there is a central vault, they may be robbed, of suffer loss of confidence.
17https://finance.yahoo.com/news/facebook-libra-made-u-dollar-205718144.html
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We will come back on this in Section 5.
As the value of Libra is pegged to several currencies the question of the
ratio is important: is the ratio proposed on September 23, 2019 definitive?
How can Facebook or the Libra Association justify it? In any case, the amount
of the currency used to back the stablecoin has to reflect the circulating supply
of the stablecoin.
2.4 Central Bank Digital Currency: CBDC
CBDCs have been discussed for several years and the interest and statements
around this topic were boosted by the announcement of the arrival of
Libra [14,22,25].
So far, the only public currency available to all citizens has been paper
money and represents a significant share of the money supply in advanced
economies. Nevertheless, there are some disadvantages to paper money: (i)
it facilitates the growth of the illegal economy, with corresponding losses in
terms of missing tax revenues, (ii) it undermines the effectiveness of monetary
policy. But in return (i) the State acquires goods and services in exchange for
banknotes, and (ii) the anonymity of the paper currency protects the privacy
of the abuse of a state, be it democratic or dictatorial, to collect information
using the payment system. We have just seen in the preceding paragraphs that
crypto-currencies represent a new means of payment for individuals, produced
and distributed according to a decentralized transfer system. Nevertheless,
the use of crypto-currencies as a means of exchange is so far limited because
of several characteristics of these currencies: their volatility, the slowness of
their transactions, anonymity, the possibility of financing terrorism or money
laundering, etc.
Beyond the resilience of traditional paper money, a natural question arises:
is there a need to create a public digital currency (or currencies)? Such
currencies (CBDC) could transform all aspects of the monetary system by
serving as a no-cost-exchange system, as a secure store of value and as a
stable unit of account for the benefit of consumers. Would it be interesting
for Central Banks to issue digital assets? Some economists consider that it
could increase GDP by reducing real interest rates, distortionary taxes and
monetary transaction costs, and that it could improve the Central Banks
ability to stabilize the business cycle, others describe efficiency gains in terms
of payments, clearing and settlement due to the absence of anonymity [5, 6].
In countries where the Central Bank has little credibility, can a decentralized
digital asset help to stabilize the economy? Assuming that some digital assets
become widely accepted, would it be possible to have bank accounts labeled
in these digital assets? If so, how would the banks integrate these accounts in
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their risk model, e.g. to compute their Basel capital adequacy rate? Underlying
these issues, there is the liability issue attached to the digital assets. Who is
responsible for any malfunction? Similarly, how to react to hacking?
The announcement of the creation of Libra has updated some of these
issues. Like paper money, it would be a legal tender: the State would guarantee
its role as a means of exchange (secure asset), but it would be distributed via
centralized electronic networks. However, it would not have the anonymity
property of the paper money which is distributed via decentralized physical
exchanges.
Obviously, a number of issues raised by the Libra project would also arise
with a CBDC, even though the Central Bank would ensure the stability of
the currency in that case. For example, in such a system, all transactions are
registered but the correspondence between user accounts and real-life identities
is not a prerequisite. Thus, two conflicting points of concern arise, which are
the privacy of users on one hand and the risk of money laundering on the other.
In this new environment, whatever protocol is considered, the issuer, the
value of the currency and the means of distribution are to be taken into account.
We analyze some of these points in the next sections in relation with the Libra
project.
3 Technical considerations on the Libra
Blockchain
The Libra Blockchain is defined as [1]:
a decentralized, programmable database designed to support a
low-volatility cryptocurrency that will have the ability to serve as an
efficient medium of exchange for billions of people around the world
Libra is already implemented in an open-source prototype, Libra Core,
distributed under the Apache 2.0 License. Note that nowhere in this paper is
the word blockchain used without being part of the currency name.
3.1 A consortium blockchain
Unlike public blockchains, all users are not equal in Libra. A set of supernodes,
called validators, are the only ones authorized to modify the database. The
other nodes will be able to have a read-only access to that database. The
validators are in charge of processing transactions and executing consensus
algorithms to keep the database in a consistent state. Finally, the transactions
are programmable (akin to the smart contracts introduced by Ethereum)
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in a new programming language called Move. In the first version, only
predefined transactions are available but in the future it is said that users will
be able to program their owns. However, no timeline is given regarding the
implementation of this feature.
The validators are the members of the Libra Association that governs the
network and manages the reserve. Initially, the validators will be entities
selected by Facebook and who paid $10 million. It is said that membership
eligibility will shift to become completely open and based only on the member’s
holdings of Libra. This organisational system would be the administrative
equivalent of a Proof-of-Stake, as it would probably be realized through a
membership to the Swiss organization. However, in the paper dedicated to
this issue [4], no clear plan is described to achieve that goal. This undermines
the description made by various media of Libra as a Proof-of-Stake system.
Currently, Libra does not include any Proof-of-Stake mechanism as
it relies on a permission system. The described governance mechanism is
in fact more similar to a Proof-of-Authority (see Appendix B).
3.2 Lifetime of a transaction
The typical interaction of a client wanting to execute a transaction is the
following:
1. The client contacts a validator node to submit a transaction. This
validator is named the leader for that transaction.
2. The validator proposes the transaction to the other validators.
3. The network of validators executes the transaction and runs a consensus
protocol.
4. The consensus protocol outputs a signature that proves that the
transaction was carried out.
Hence, all transactions must first be proposed by a leader who acts as an
intermediary between the client and the network of validators. It is to be noted
that there is no protection against censorship attack in the system as described.
For example, a validator could refuse to treat a transaction and claim that
they cannot execute it for the moment because of a global issue or just return
an invalid answer.
3.3 Databases
We introduce the database of transactions, the queries and the user accounts
and their relation with real-world entities.
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3.3.1 The database of transactions
The data of the Libra Blockchain is constituted of a versioned ledger modified
by transactions that produce outputs. Each ledger version is identified by a
number equal to the number of transactions that have been executed. The
ledger’s state at time i is noted Si. Applying transaction Ti to Si−1 produces
Si along with an output Oi. Thus, the entire database at time n is constituted
of the triplets (Si, Ti, Oi) for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Even the Libra paper states: “There is no concept of a block of transactions
in the ledger history.” How then can Libra be called a blockchain?
3.3.2 Queries
The whitepaper [1] claims that clients will be able to issue queries to read
data from the global database. When a transaction is executed, the database is
modified and the new state is collectively signed by all or a part of the validators.
This allows a client to verify the answer to a query without trusting the third
party.
Furthermore, the sparse Merkle tree data structure allows any client to
perform authenticated read queries. Thus, those queries can be answered by
any actor with a copy of the state, and this actor will be able to generate
the cryptographic proof that the answer is correct. A similar mechanism allows
untrusted third parties to provide feeds for events that can be cryptographically
verified by any client.
Downloading the entire database should also be possible, and is said to
allow the verification of past transactions. However, no mechanism is described
to report or punish a dishonest validator through the Libra protocol.
3.3.3 User Accounts
Libra uses an account system that authenticates users through public-key
cryptography. An account can possess both data and code. For example, the
data will contain the amount of Libra this account possesses. An account is
not linked by the Libra protocol to a real-world identity. However, the US
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and terrorism financing standards that must
be met by Facebook will force the Libra exchanges to register the real-world
identity of people when they change fiat currencies for Libra18. For the existing
crypto-currencies (like Bitcoin), most of the crypto-exchanges already record
the banking information of their clients. However, since coin mining is possible
in Bitcoin, anybody can in theory obtain new money that is not linked to any
18https://cointelegraph.com/news/libra-must-comply-with-anti-money-laundering-
standards-us-treasury
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real-world identity. This problem does not exist in Libra as the only way to
create new coins is to invest in the reserve of the Libra Association.
However, if a new user receives money from an existing user, it is not possible
to know the real-world identity of the receiver unless the sender discloses it. Will
Facebook require new accounts to be linked to a real-world identity? If they
don’t, the cost of any investigation for money laundering will skyrocket. If they
do, it will give the members of the Libra Association a significant edge over the
other nodes by allowing them to know the real-world identity of the accounts
and aggregate the behavior of individuals.
Hence, it is probable that the mapping between real-world entities and
Libra accounts will constitute another source of data, not stored by the Libra
blockchain but by the Association members.
Thus, Libra places itself in opposition to the very foundations of
crypto-currencies, namely the cypherpunk and crypto anarchist movements
aiming to overcome the centralization of banking services.
3.4 Programmable resources
Programs defined on the Libra blockchain are called modules and are similar
to Ethereum’s smart contracts. They are represented in the Move bytecode
19. The Move language is not yet released and in the current version of Libra,
a lower-level but human-readable language (called Move IR for intermediate
representation) is used.
Thus, it can be considered that any module distributed through the Libra
blockchain will be open-source. Because the Apache 2.0 license under which
Libra Core is released is a permissive license, the Libra modules can be
licensed differently by their creators. What steps will Libra take to protect
the intellectual property of their users?
3.4.1 Security
For the moment, no feature to update modules is implemented, which raises
security concerns as it won’t be possible to fix even known bugs before
attackers find them. Attacks of smart contracts on the Ethereum platform
are frequent [3]. The most famous, The DAO attack, allowed hackers to steal
3.6 million Ether in a few hours, worth about $50 million at the time and
more than $700 million now. Other errors of implementation can freeze smart
contracts, making their assets unusable instead of stealing them.
19Bytecodes are a mid-level representation of a program: the highest level is the
human-readable source code whereas the lowest level is the compiled program. A bytecode
is typically executed by a virtual machine and for most existing languages, it is possible to
easily produce human-readable source code from a bytecode representation.
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If accounts are linked to real-world identities, attacks will be less likely on
the Libra Blockchain as legal sanctions would be applicable. However, this risk
is not non-existent, with some countries not being bound by extradition treaties.
Even worse, these bugs could be triggered inadvertently and unlike transferred
money that can be sent back, burnt money is not normally recoverable. What
guarantees will Libra offer to address smart contract bugs? For the moment,
type-safety, reference-safety, and resource-safety are guaranteed by bytecode
verification but it doesn’t exclude. Are the Association or the validators likely
to reverse some transactions? How will they decide to do so?
3.4.2 The gas mechanism
To mitigate the risk of denial-of-service attacks, Libra uses the gas mechanism
introduced by Ethereum: every transaction is associated with a cost imputed
to the client and expressed in gas. The fee associated with any transaction
is proportional to the computing power used by the transaction and can be
predicted (e.g. every operation has a fixed cost). However, the gas price is
subject to variations over time: it rises when there are a lot of transactions
to execute. The mechanism that decides the gas price is not detailed in the
paper. A consequence of the gas system is that validators are supposed to treat
transactions with higher gas price first and are allowed to dismiss some of the
others.
Since the gas price is not publicly determined by the protocol or by a trusted
actor, validators are free to “drop transactions with low prices when the system
is congested” [1]. This means that the level of the fees can change arbitrarily
and dynamically and this process is not clear for the users. The user has no
guarantee that his transaction will be done, depending on the fees they propose.
This raises concerns over competition mechanisms that will come into play. A
rule capping the gas price in normal load situations should therefore be put in
place, to prevent consumer isolation and ensure the liquidity of Libra.
3.4.3 Storage capabilities
Beside computation power, another limited resource is memory. The paper
mentions the possibility of a similar gas system to limit storage. Even in
the absence of such mechanism, a denial-of-service attack based on short-term
memory would be costly: the memory usage of any program is always limited
(up to a constant) by the number of operations it makes. Instead, the real cost
of the memory is for long-term storage.
Thus, a rent-based system along with a policy to define data expiration
times would be more adapted to limit the storage used by transactions and
is briefly described. In this mechanism, a fee in Libra would be charged and
proportional to the size of the data and the time during which it has to be
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accessible. However, in that system, the validator nodes are said to be able
to recache the contents of a transaction after the expiration time. Thus, the
validators still keep a copy of any data.
This memory management system raises further concerns regarding data
protection laws. For example, no company targeting European customers
should use a Libra smart contract to store personal data because of the right
to erasure (see Section 4.4).
3.5 The Byzantine consensus protocol
At the core of Libra is the concept of Byzantine fault tolerance, which allows
components of a distributed system to fail unpredictably without disrupting
the operation of the whole system.
The Byzantine consensus protocol of Libra, LibraBFT, is based on HotStuff
and similar to a lot of modern protocols. The collective decisions are all
authenticated using Quorum Certificates, as in most Byzantine agreement
algorithms. Such QCs are collective signatures that ensure that two thirds
of the validators agreed to a transaction. The particularity of the QCs used
by Libra is that they preserve the identity of the validators who signed.
Thus, the cryptographic internals of the signature mechanism are problematic
to determine the liability of the validators. If an unlawful transaction was
validated, the responsibility would probably be shared by all the validators as
there is no way to know the identity of the validators who accepted it.
3.6 Authorized resellers
The service of conversion between fiat currencies and Libra is planned to be
ensured by authorized resellers.
As with any secured system, the weakest spot is its interactions with other
systems. Authorized resellers will be able to indirectly control the minting and
burning of coins by exchanging fiat and Libra coins and asking the validators
to adapt the volume of coins to the demand. How are the communications
between the resellers and the Libra association secured and authenticated?
What measures are put in place to ensure the trustworthiness of the resellers?
How is the risk that some resellers go bankrupt managed?
3.7 Latency and resiliency
The blockchain is said to support up to 1,000 transactions per second with
10-second intervals between transactions [1]: is it sufficient to be competitive
against other systems? It seems that the volume of exchanges will be much
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lower than what is offered by the other classical payments like Visa, Mastercard
or Paypal who withdrew from the project in October 2019.
We also learn in the same paper that validators will be able to store up
to 4 billions accounts and that they are free to discard historical data to be
able to process new transactions. What is the insurance for a client that
their transactions have not been discarded? Nothing is said about consumer
protection or traceability.
4 Regulatory aspects
In the previous Section, we have addressed some questions arising from
the protocol itself, mainly about the protection of the customers (account,
transaction, privacy, security, etc.). In this Section, we address some other
regulatory aspects concerning the Libra project. First, we describe the dual
governance system of the Association and of the protocol. We then ask
questions about the applicability of an external jurisdiction. We also approach
the regulation of Libra as a platform of payment. Finally, we analyse the
applicability of data protection directives like the GDPR to Libra.
4.1 Governance
A centralized organization is naturally given a hierarchy that is liable and
must deal with any situation that does not achieve the chosen objective. In the
decentralized world, this structure does not always exist and rules have to be
put in place to reduce bad behaviors and negative outcomes. Thus, specifying
the governance system becomes crucial to control the actions of the ecosystem
actors.
It is important to distinguish between two different levels of governance
that are relevant for Libra: the traditional governance of the Libra Association
based in Switzerland, and the algorithmic governance of the Libra Blockchain
yet to be launched.
4.1.1 Governance of the Libra Association
The governance of the Libra Association is similar to a circle of investors who
have paid the amount required to belong to the Association. This Association
manages the code (development, update, search, extension of the system, ...).
Concerning the governance of the Association, in an interview with senators
on July 16, 2019, David Marcus (CEO of Calibra) declared: “you’ll have
this council of a hundred or more members that will make decisions and will
elect a board that will be between five to nineteen members and that board
will then of course elect a managing director and the Association will have a
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staff to perform the governance function that it is supposed to look after”20.
Nevertheless, nothing is specified for the moment on the way the decisions will
be taken: What is the voting system of the Association? How do new members
enter the Association? On other side, who can leave the network and how?
Concerning possibly malicious members, what rules are to be applied?
Can they be banned? What are the consequences for the management of the
Reserve? Are the mechanisms put in place by Libra sufficiently clear, supposing
they exist?
4.1.2 Governance of the Libra Blockchain
It seems that Libra wants to implement some sort of algorithmic governance:
“[The Libra Association] can create Move modules that delegate the authority
to mint and burn coins to an operational arm that interacts with authorized
resellers.” [1]. Thus, using Move, they will be able to use “flexible governance
mechanisms such as this will allow the Council to assert its authority and take
over its delegated authority through a vote”. It is not clear how the members
of the Association are concerned in the decision of the management of the
Reserve which is a key point for this project [1].
Distributed governance is based on a flat-hierarchy philosophy and on
the idea that token holders will dedicate sufficient time to participate and
vote according to the interests of the company. To strengthen the investor
involvement, many projects have thus developed incentives which can be
summarized as a monetization of attention methodology, by granting rewards
(like tokens) to acquire the attention of a network of investors. What powers
will be given to validators? Their role need to be clearly identified and defined
in the Libra project.
A conflict between validators could happen. How does the protocol react
to avoid collusion, misappropriation of funds or non-compliance with rules to
make transactions in a continuous and non-discriminatory way?
In fact, we observe that in the first version of Libra, the validation process
will be controlled by the founding members of the Libra Association. Then,
the Libra project aims to move toward a decentralized governance architecture.
However, no clear plan or technical protocol is proposed to achieve this objective.
This new governance process that combines traditional and algorithmic
governance has not been totally analyzed and opens interesting questions.
Indeed, governance of decision-making bodies plays a crucial role in the stability
design. The stability mechanism will be automated in a day-by-day functioning
on the network, but monetary and fiscal policies, like the management of the
Reserve, cannot be fully automated.
20https://youtu.be/xUQpmEjgFAU?t=4294
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4.2 External jurisdiction
The biggest obstacle to the legislation of Blockchain technologies is that they
are traditionally decentralized by essence. However, Libra, as a stable coin,
aims to represent a new milestone in the adoption of Blockchain technologies.
The pegging mechanism they introduce is based on a centralized governance
by the Libra Association. As such, regulations could be applied to this entity.
This Association is based in Switzerland. However, all members are from
foreign countries, with a majority of American members.
From the European point of view, it is already a matter of defining the
object to be regulated: is it an electronic money as per the Electronic Money
Directive (EMD2), a financial instrument as per the Market in Financial
Instruments Directive (MiFID), a fund as per the Payment Service Directive
(PSD2)21, or an object of a new nature that does not constitute a regular
activity under European law?
In some aspects, the technological nature of this project can get in the way
of the regulators. For example, in the event of an inquiry about a wrongful
transaction validated through the Libra protocol, all validators (currently
the members of the Association) would be involved because the anonymous
signature mechanism protects the identity of the validators who accepted that
transaction.
4.3 Libra as a payment platform
4.3.1 Authorization
In order to be able to play the role of payment platforms, the Libra payment
platform must seek the authorization of the financial authorities. They
filed such a request to the FIMNA22 in Switzerland on September 11, 2019.
Simultaneously, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, wrote
on his Twitter account: “If Facebook and other companies want to become
a bank, they must seek a new Banking Charter and become subject to all
Banking Regulations, just like other Banks, both National and International.”23.
How is it possible for Libra to meet the demand of regulators when the
rules in terms of regulation are very different from one country to another?
What will be the trust of countries in that currency and the transactions done
with it? May there be an embargo on the Libra from some countries?
21 “Directive 2004/39/EC”. Official Journal of the European Union. 2004. Retrieved 20
March 2008.
22Financial Market Supervisory Authority
23https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1149472284702208000
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It is important that all countries adopt the same policy regarding Libra: if
one country authorizes Libra as an asset, the conversion to all currencies will
be possible by propagation.
4.3.2 Consumer protection
At the infrastructure level, what would happen if the system was unavailable
(whatever the cause of the unavailability), thus interrupting all transactions?
The economy of one or more countries would be blocked. To whom the
customers of this system could turn to case of injury? Several courts of justice
would be concerned. We already see many disparities in the current legislation
regarding the status of blockchain [7, 16]. How can these issues be understood
in the framework of Libra?
Will the principles of scalability developed in the Move code be able to
avoid traffic jams: it is proposed to increase the level of fees in case of high
demand. How to be sure that will be enough? Would customers have insurance
in terms of maximum time for the transfer of their requests?
What would happen in case of cyber-attack (or just in case of rumors of
this type)? One can easily foresee a panic phenomena on the part of holders
of Libra who will try to sell their assets, potentially leading to a risk of bank run.
4.3.3 Know Your Customer and Anti-Money Laundering
The fight against corruption, especially in the banking system, is not a new
subject. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), although published in
1977 in a very turbulent environment marked by the Watergate case, remains
more relevant than ever. Its implementation remains a joint priority of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in the United States. The UK also published very strong regulation,
the UK Bribery Act in July 2011, which is recognized as one of the most
demanding anti-corruption laws.
In 1989 the G7 established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and
decided that “When a company acts for a customer, it must know the beneficial
owner of the operation, that is to say the natural person(s) who own or control
effectively a client and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is
done” [18].
Recently, authorities in the US and abroad have increased their focus on
modernizing and enforcing anti-money laundering and terrorism financing
(AML) regulations. As part of these efforts, the US’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed Know Your Customer (KYC)
requirements in 2014, which were finalized in 2016. FinCEN’s KYC
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requirements were proposed as part of a broader regulation setting out the
core elements of a customer due diligence program. Taken together, these
elements are intended to help financial institutions to avoid illicit transactions
by improving their view of their clients’ identities and business relationships.24
Concomitantly, Europe adopted the Directive 2014/95 / EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council on October 22, 2014 amending Directive 2013/34
/ EU concerning “the publication of non-financial information and information
on the diversity of their activities by certain large companies and groups”.
Following this directive, for example in France, the Sapin II law passed in
2016 and imposes that companies with an international dimension comply
with certain national and international laws and regulations linked to the fight
against corruption in relation with extraterritoriality rules in particular25.
The concepts of extra-territoriality are associated with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) to combat bribery of public officials abroad. It covers
all acts of corruption by companies or persons, US or non-US, that are either
located in the US, or simply listed on US stock exchanges, or who participate
in a way or another to a regulated financial market in the United States. It is
implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Countries have also tightened their legislation, and supervisory institutions
are responsible for these issues, the TracFin, and CNIL in France, in England
this concerns the FSA, La Bafin in Germany, in Singapore the MAS, etc.
Thus, each financial institution has to indulge in the Know-Your-Customer
(KYC) process with customers to comply with regulations, such as Anti-Money
Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Each
Line of Business within a financial institution performs their own customer
checks. The customer typically provides KYC documents each time he requires
services within an institution. How is Libra going to solve to protect the
customer and provide the information at the institutions responsible of the
supervision relative to KYC, AML and CFT? As part of the implementation of
a regulation, it will be necessary to establish a system verifying that the rules
governing the KYC process and the AML regulations are respected. What
entity, independent of Libra, could play this role?
4.4 Compliance with Data Protection Directives
We first remind the reader that Libra possesses data at at least two very
different levels: the blockchain transaction data that are public and the
user account data (see section 3.3.3) that will be owned by companies. The
former is limited and difficult to regulate while the regulatory efforts should be
concentrated on the latter. Some third-party services might also emerge around
24https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07/fincen-know-your-customer-requirements/
25The Sapin II Law (2016). 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016.
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Libra, we also put them in the second category. In this part, we mainly address
the regulation of the first category, the blockchain transaction data, as it is the
most original and difficult to comprehend.
In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)26 that came
into application on May 2018 has the objective to reach a balance between
data protection and legitimate use of data. The GDPR aims among other
things to take into account the significant technological developments on the
past 25 years, keeping their goal of the protection of the individual rights.
The database technology that enables the decentralization of data storage and
processing through blockchain seems to be difficult to interpret in the frame of
the GDPR. If those challenges seem difficult with public blockchain, in the case
of a private permissioned network, the requirements could be easier to interpret
and implement. They have to be identified and integrated in the process. We
list some of the obligations created by the GDPR and try to understand if Libra
has taken them into account.
Some issues that Libra needs to address to be compliant with the GDPR
rules concern: (i) the identification of the identity and obligations of data
controllers and data processors, (ii) the identification of the processings that
are necessary for the performance of the service (article 6.1 of the GDPR),
(iii) the exercise of some data subject rights: it could be difficult to rectify
or remove personal data from the network (right to erasure). Thus, the main
point for regulators is to identify a data controller having lawful grounds to
collect the information as defined in the GDPR, must be transparent about
how it intends to use the data and must ensure that he does nothing unlawful
with them.
This data controller also has the responsibility to safeguard the personal
data they collect “whether against hacks or against accidental loss, destruction
and damage”27. The personal data “shall be collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes”, and only used for the purposes that have been stated,
and also data “must be kept in a form which permits identification for data
subjects for no longer than necessary” for the stated purposed.
In the case of Libra, where validators are part of the governance, rules
need to be precisely defined to decide who is able to see the data and who is
going to play the role of data controller or of joint controllers. In any case
each network participant should agree to some terms and conditions relative to
GDPR directives before being granted access to the network.
An important fact is that, because of the decentralized nature of Libra,
26 “Official Journal L 119/2016”. eur-lex.europa.eu. Archived from the original on 22
November 2018. Retrieved 26 May 2018.
27“EUR-Lex – 32016R0679 – EN – EUR-Lex”. eur-lex.europa.eu. Archived from the original
on 17 March 2018. Retrieved 21 March 2018.
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the data will be shared with nodes all over the world. Hence, the GDPR rules
regarding data transfers outside the EU apply to any data present on the Libra
Blockchain.
The regulation of other countries can somehow get in the way. For example,
how is it possible to reconcile the GDPR and the CLOUD (Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data) Act? The former asks for respect of the data ownership
where as the latter clarifies the rules allowing the US authorities to requisition
data stored outside their territory by U.S.-based technology companies. We
know that this American regulation poses difficulties in terms of respect for
privacy, especially for Europeans. What solution does Libra propose to answer
at the same time the requests of the GDPR and the CLOUD Act?
5 Risks and Libra’s project
What is the real objective of the Libra project? The Libra project is at the
opposite of a decentralized system even if it is presented as using a peer-to-peer
system. Decentralized systems facilitate innovation and competition to produce
newer, better and cheaper financial services: this aspect is not clear with this
project. Indeed, it is said that the project can move to this decentralisation,
but how to be sure of this evolution and how will it work?
Any project based on a blockchain-related innovative system creates new
risks we need to analyze. This project is challenging because it combines many
risks for which answers and strategies must be developed. We can distinguish
several kind of risks (without being exhaustive): financial, economic, political,
technological, operational, ethic, privacy, etc. even if the barrier between all
these risks is not strict. As soon as the project was brought up in June 2019,
some of these risks have been identified. It is interesting to verify whether
Libra addresses them in the documents that are available.
5.1 Political risks
The political risk is probably the first one that the national institutions and
politics mentioned as soon as the project has been announced. Some concerns
are:
• Monetary sovereignty. We can consider this risk from three different
approaches. (i) What is the impact of Libra on existing fiat currencies?
(ii) Does the Libra project influence or activate the decision of creation
of CBDCs by some countries? (iii) Can the creation of a supra-national
currency impact the global financial system?
(i) What would be the impact on the economy of a country if the
use of Libra were to reach a significant percentage of the monetary
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exchanges, knowing that Libra is backed 50% on the US dollar? Could
we imagine sanctions coming from the USA on commercial exchanges in
Libra with some countries against which the American government decided
an embargo? Conversely, would a country whose economy is partially
dependent on the Libra be able to support economic sanctions against the
US?
Moreover, the sovereign status of any national currency seems protected
because it is used to pay taxes. Can one imagine that this evolves in the
future, and that it will be possible to pay taxes in Libra?
(ii) The proposal of creation of Central Bank Digital Currencies, in
response to the rise of cryptocurrencies, is not new as we know that Central
Banks are in the process of creating their own cryptocurrencies-stablecoins
pegged to their own fiat currencies. Thus, in the future, we will see the
emergence of several national CBDCs. What will be their relationship with
fiat currencies? A new exchange market will emerge creating some new
instability. What will be the success of these stable coins? For sovereignty
reasons, States must have a perfect knowledge of the technology they use
and completely control their protocol.
(iii) Is Libra really a danger for the global financial system? Other
systems have already been put in place in some countries to unify
payments and act as an interface between transactions: it is the case
for instance in India with WhatsApp. However, WhatsApp Pay depends
on the Indian government’s Unified Payments Interface to handle the
transactions. Other companies develop similar services like Humaniq or
Kiva, but they have not as much money or technological resources as
Facebook. On another side, can Libra disrupt Visa or Mastercard? It
is not probably the goal of this project. Their geographical influence
area will not correspond to the regions in which Facebook is interested to
develop this new ecosystem. In any case, it will be important to analyse
and understand how these different systems can competitively exist. For
instance, what will happen to the stable coins currently in use like Tether
and Dai with the arrival of Libra and CBDCs?
• Adoption by emerging countries. Some countries, particularly
emerging countries, are ready to support this project, as access to financial
services is still limited for some groups of people. As most emerging
countries probably won’t have the technical means to create their own
digital currency in the near future, should Libra bear this new avatar
of the “white man’s burden”? Indeed, one can consider that the new
Libra ecosystem could address some of these issues, serving as platform for
innovative financial services, like seamlessly sending money. Should people
use Libra instead of their national currencies in developing countries, what
would be the impact on the national economies? Would they plummet in
favor of international exchanges?
• Partial adoption. A risk would be the emergence of two blocks of
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countries, one rejecting the project and its use, and the other block
accepting this currency. This situation would be an element of global
friction and create more financial instability than stability. One of the
major consequences would be the difficulty of setting up trade flows
smoothly. From a macro-economic point of view, what would be the
sustainability of a world monetary system, with fiat transactions on one
side and transactions using an oligopolistic type of currency like Libra on
the other? Thus, we argue that the ability of a single country to authorize
or ban Libra at its level is at most an illusion, and that the practicability of
a unified regulatory framework will be a determinant factor in the decision
process.
5.2 Financial risks
Even if the Libra’s project is not finalized and has to be postponed due to
the recent demands of regulators, institutions and banking system, we can
discuss several questions related to the position of Libra in the landscape of
the financial industry.
First of all, it is important to recall the specificities of a bank: they are
institutions that fall under a regulatory umbrella covering institutions that offer
insured deposits and their holding companies. The regulatory apparatus that
restricts the actions of banks was built largely because banks offer deposits,
which bring both value and fragility [17]. To mitigate the risk, banks are
subject to regulatory costs. For instance, banks abide by many regulations that
force them to take extra steps to make sure that their customers are not using
their services for money laundering. Banks are also required to hold minimum
amounts of capital to satisfy existing regulations. We currently observe that
FinTech firms do not have to follow the same regulations [8]. It is interesting to
understand how Libra will be positioned in relation to the obligations related
to the creation of money, deposits, etc.
• Libra as a bank. Can Libra have the status of Central Bank? If Libra
finalizes their project, a stable digital currency will be created along with a
reserve created by the staking of the investors. However, the management
of monetary policies must remain the private turf of Central Banks for
reasons of national sovereignty and financial stability. Thus, the regulators
need to clarify how this project can emerge. Since Libra challenges the
financial status quo, it will also be of importance for Central Banks to
respond to the innovation brought by this project.
• Financial stability. Does the system proposed by Libra increase
financial stability or in return create more uncertainty for the world
population? Libra wants to be a fast, easy, cheap and secure payment
system to ensure liquidity. The current protocol seems to solve this
question even if we note in section 3 a certain number of questions
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regarding access, security, etc. How can we be sure that this system
will not evolve to become more restrictive, creating a gap between the
expectations of the user and the final objective of the project?
• Convertibility. What is the expected exchanges rate of Libra? The
importance of convertibility of Libra to other currencies need to be
explained in detail for the users. The political and regulatory choices
regarding Libra will not be probably the same for countries all around the
world, and could be changed at any period of time. Thus, a currency risk
can emerge and will impact for instance the possibility to buy groceries
or other things with other currencies than Libra.
• Bank run could happen in case of cyber-risks, frauds, panic, etc. If a lot
of people decide to change their Libra (congestion risk) to fiat or CBDC
currencies, it could cause a systemic risk, with a cascade of failures for the
investors associated to the project. In terms of management risk, how has
this kind of crisis been taken into account by the Libra project? Is the
existence of the Reserve sufficient to avoid this crisis? What would happen
in the event that a major actor leaves the network, like this happened with
Paypal, Visa, Mastercard and Stripe?
The safety of a bank in a traditional system is controlled by the regulator
following very specific steps, and it is based on the computation of a capital
requirement encompassing the risks the bank faces. What equivalent
system will Libra propose to avoid such failure? What guarantees does
this project offer? Libra promises to keep a fiat reserve matching the Libra
supply. However, no plan for accountability is provided. Will Libra, as a
banking activity, be subject to capital requirements defined by regulators?
5.3 Economic risks
In relation to the financial stability, the economy of countries can be impacted
by the creation of a new currency. Not repeating the definition or the status of
Libra as a currency, we indicate some new situations that can appear with the
emergence of this project.
• Antitrust concerns. Does the Libra system promote the creation of an
oligopolistic market?28.
As early as August 2019, Europe questioned the potentially
anti-competitive behavior of Libra29. The status of Facebook as
advertiser, which is already the motive of antitrust investigations including
28Oligopoly is a market structure with a small number of firms, none of which can keep the
others from having significant influence.
29https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-20/facebook-s-libra-
currency-gets-european-union-antitrust-scrutiny
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one in Europe 30 and one conducted by 47 US state attorneys general31,
strengthens those concerns. Indeed, a widely missing feature in online
advertising is the ability to track whether an advertisement has led to a
purchase. Such an advertisement would be sold for a higher price and
could grant the advertiser a commission on the sale. With Libra, it will
be child’s play for Facebook to track the user’s expenses and thus widen
the gap with its competitors.
From another point of view, what will competition between systems based
on stable crypto-currencies look like? What will be the equilibrium
between a system based on both fiat and stable coins and a system
using only stable coins? Is a macro economic model able to explain in
a robust way this equilibrium and what are the constraints to attain it?
The literature on the subject matter suggests that the balance might be
difficult to find [24,27].
• Taxation. How will tax authorities come up to Libra? Backing Libra into
a currency basket does not protect it from exchange rate fluctuations. As
soon as capital gains emerge, taxes will apply. In the US, the current
IRS law treats digital currency as property, so every single transaction or
purchase made with Libra will be a taxable event. In France, in November
2018, the taxation of cryptocurrencies was aligned with that of securities.
The highest values are taxed at 30% according to the flat tax mechanism.
Hence, Libra holders will have to take into account the tax regulations of
each country. When transferring Libra or goods, there will be also the
need to trace and report annually all payments for the calculation of these
taxes. What does Libra plan to ease the work of the fiscal administrations?
How clearly will taxpayers be informed of these obligations?
5.4 Technological risks
The creation of a new protocol opens the doors to new questions and risks. We
have already listed some of them when we analysed this protocol in Section 3.
Since the protocol is not yet in production, all risks are not identified, but we
discuss some of them.
• Unplanned program behaviors. We know that problems can arise,
such as operational failures, code vulnerabilities, malicious programs, etc.
The ability to solve them fast will make the system even more robust.
• Operational risks. They concern cyberattacks, fraud, hacking, etc. and
are linked to the security of the protocol. Are the procedures put in place
to limit these risks clearly explained?
30https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-02/facebook-is-latest-to-
come-under-eu-s-antitrust-scrutiny
31https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-gives-update-
facebook-antitrust-investigation
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• Data collection. These questions are already addressed in Section 4,
we come back to them because they are fundamental: Where and how
are customer data stored and who has access to them? What are the
authentication methods used? How has Libra planned to implement the
laws on anti money laundering? Where are the user account data (see
section 3.3.3) stored, in order to check if KYC is respected?
• Personal data. In practical terms, when considering the use of
obfuscation, encryption and aggregation techniques to process personal
data, one must consider two risks: (i) the risk that misuse reduces the
strength of the cryptographic algorithms (we suppose that the target
security levels are respected) (ii) the risk that encrypted data can be
linked back to an individual by examining patterns and contexts of usage,
possibly by aggregation with other information sources. Furthermore, the
use of AML/KYC data for other purposes must be closely monitored and
prevented.
• Updates of the protocol. How can the protocol updates be assessed?
How frequent will the protocol be updated? This point is important for
regulation, hence the need — as for AI algorithms — to have an accurate,
clear, detailed documentation to know this information in due time.32
• Systemic risk. What happens upon failure of the Libra protocol? A
platform outage could be caused by various phenomenon (bug, internet
outage, censorship, power outage, etc.). It would deprive all users of their
means of payment, purchase, transfers, communication. What solutions
does Libra provide to address these extreme failure cases? However, in
the area of systemic risks, decentralized systems can be considered to be
more reliable than centralized ones.
• Interoperability. If a user wants to use another wallet than Calibra,
will it be possible or easy to export their keys and Calibra data to another
platform? In his hearing before the US Senate, David Marcus announced
that Calibra would be interoperable with WhatsApp. What about other
platforms? We note that the GDPR introduced a “right to portability”.
5.5 Ethic and regulation
We cannot analyze the Libra phenomenon without talking about ethics. We
have covered this topic several times throughout the paper. We come back and
specify some points that we think are important.
• Bank status. If Libra has a status close to that of a bank, it is essential
for it to be subject to the same rules as other banks in order to avoid
bankruptcy. This raises the question of the risk measure to be used which
32Remember that the protocol that we analyze today (October 2019) is a prototype. It will
probably evolve before deployment.
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will encompass all the risks associated with this new environment. All
regulators adopting a common policy for calculating this financial risk will
be crucial. Can the Basel III directives be applied? What adjustments
must be made to integrate stable coins into risk calculations?
• Data property. The question of data ownership is at the heart of the
project. How can the Libra system be made compliant with the rules
of the GDPR? How can two systems as complex and antithetical as the
CLOUD Act and the GDPR co-exist?
• Consumer protection. What guarantees does the consumer have in
case of a stolen account, transactions that are not made, or piracy of the
platform? Can we imagine that the proposed protocol would go against
the law (e.g. no refund in case of theft)?
• Moral hazard is a legitimate concern, as most of the assets controlled by
the Libra Association will be deposited by the users. Indeed, the double
nature of Libra as a reserve of value and a mean of payment is involved
as the real risk bearers will be the users who entrusted Libra with the
management of their assets and use it as a payment platform. However,
this risk can be minimized in the presence of a regulatory supervision of
the project.
Moreover, the global misinformation regarding this project (including
its widely undisputed status of cryptocurrency) creates an information
asymmetry between the Libra project and its users who are attracted by
the cryptocurrency fad. Finally, most users probably won’t be in the know
about the collusion between Facebook’s advertiser interests and the Libra
project. Therefore, more effort should be dedicated to raise the consumers’
awareness about the inner workings of online advertising.
6 Conclusion
Regardless of the purpose of the Libra project, all the discussions and official
statements clearly indicate that, for future similar projects, the constraints
that will be imposed on confidentiality, money laundering, consumer protection
and financial stability will have to be taken into account from the outset in
the drafting of the protocol and the governance of the project. For Libra to
launch, a good compromise is yet to be found between the novelty necessary
to attract customers and the legal constraints that are not negotiable. The
announcement of Libra as a crypto-currency serves both purposes: it rides the
wave of enthusiasm towards crypto-currencies and scares potential regulators
with technical matters. On the contrary, we rather tend to think of Libra as a
digital currency.
A major lesson that can be drawn from the reaction of the different actors
and our analysis is that regulating Libra will be a hard task since it has to
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be carried out on a global level. First, the double governance of the system
must be taken into account: there is an organisational scale through the Libra
Association and a network scale through the consensus protocol. Hence, the
technical aspect must not become a barrier for non-expert regulators who
already possess the competences to regulate the Libra Association. However,
the technology will also have to be taken into account in a second time. This
will represent a significant endeavor for the regulators, given the extent of
the confusion brought along by the Libra project, but even what seems to be
details can prove to be crucial to assess the risks. For example, the anonymity
of the nodes who validated a transaction is a property of the cryptography
used in the Quorum Certificates, and will make establishing the liability of a
single actor impossible in the event of fraudulent transactions.
Most worryingly, the vagueness of the non-technical aspects of the project
is without precedent. Up until now, Facebook seems to have focused their
efforts on the technical aspect of their project and overlooked the absence of
clear rules for the governance of the network. Notwithstanding the political,
economic and ethical aspects, the biggest technological risks are not internal
dysfunctions of the Libra Blockchain but lie in its interactions with the outside
world that are not specified: consumer protection, KYC/AML, authorized
resellers, etc. Furthermore, there is a clear mismatch between Facebook’s
objective through Libra and the consumer’s interests as most people ignore the
mechanisms of online advertising.
Nevertheless, an open question is the desirability of a “synthetic hegemonic
currency”33 replacing the dollar in international payments, as described by Mark
Carney, the outgoing Governor of the Bank of England. Indeed, the currently
dollar-dominated international monetary system raises concerns regarding the
dependence of any international exchange on the dollar, the ensuing liquidity
shortage, the pressure on falling interest rates on government bonds and the
uncertainty of the Central Banks which are dependent on the US Federal
Reserve. What stable currency could replace the dollar? Probably not the
Libra that is backed by national currencies and that will not be able to provide
liquidity in times of crisis. It will be up to the national banks to solve this last
problem. In addition, an international currency also has the property of being
backed by a fiscal authority able to collect taxes, which will never be the case
of Libra. The issuance of CBDCs might prove a solution to this problem.
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A Public and Private blockchains
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are electronic money based on a peer-to-peer or
decentralized system using cryptography to validate transactions and also to
create money. The protocol is a decentralized fiduciary mechanism to avoid
the use of a trusted third party. The principle of decentralization implies that
everyone can participate in the drafting of the code (it must nevertheless obtain
an entrance fee). The blockchain associated to cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin is
the sequence of all transactions. The use of cryptography ensures the security
of transactions and their routing throughout the world.
The blockchain technology through which the transactions are executed is
a technology of storage and transmission of information, transparent, secure,
and functioning without a central control body. By extension, a blockchain
is a database that contains the history of all the exchanges made between its
users since its creation. This database is secure and distributed: it is shared by
its different users, without intermediaries, which allows everyone to check the
validity of the chain. Such a blockchain is a public blockchain.
Transactions between network users are grouped in blocks. Each block
is validated by the nodes of the network called the miners, according to
techniques that depend on the type of blockchain. In the Bitcoin blockchain,
this technique is called “Proof-of-Work”, and consists in solving algorithmic
problems using an important computing power with consensus principle by all
nodes present on the network. Once the block is validated, it is time-stamped
and added to the blockchain. The transaction is then visible to the receiver as
well as the entire network.
We can distinguish three main types of blockchain system, public blockchain,
consortium and private blockchains. Public blockchains are decentralized and
available to anyone with an internet connection, no one has control over the
network and they are secure in that the data can’t be changed once validated
on the blockchain: an example is the Bitcoin blockchain. Private blockchains
are typically used in enterprise solutions to solve business cases and underpin
corporate software solutions. They are said to be permissioned: participants
need to obtain an invitation or permission to join the network, an example
is the R3 Corda blockchain. The consortium blockchain is a “semi-private”
system with a controlled user group, but works across different organizations.
We classify Libra as a consortium blockchain.
B Different protocols
The transfer and creation of crypto-currencies lie on different protocols. These
protocols allow to make the transactions secure and to verify that they can be
done. Several kinds of protocols exist: Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols have
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been used for instance for Bitcoin while Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the Delegate
Proof-of-Stake (dPoS) and Proof-of-Authority (PoA) protocols are alternative
protocols to PoW.
Proof-of-Work is used by Bitcoin and a lot of other crypto-currencies
to create crypto-currencies and transfer them. PoW is a specification that
defines an expensive computation, called mining, that needs to be performed
in order to create a new group of trusted transactions (the so-called block) on
a distributed ledger called blockchain. Mining serves to verify the legitimacy of
a transaction, avoiding the so-called double-spending problem, and to regulate
money creation by rewarding miners for performing the previous task. To
get the rewards, miners solve a mathematical puzzle known as Proof-of-Work
problem. In most PoW protocols, this “mathematical puzzle” is an operation
of inverse hashing: it determines a number (nonce) such that the cryptographic
hash algorithm of block data is less than a given threshold. This threshold,
called difficulty, is what determine the competitive nature of mining: the more
computing power is added to the network, the higher this parameter increases,
increasing also the average number of calculations needed to create a new
block. This method also increases the cost of block creation, pushing miners to
improve the efficiency of their mining systems to maintain a positive economic
balance.
Proof-of-Stake is a different way to validate transactions and achieve
distributed consensus. It can also be called Proof-of-Participation (PoP). This
algorithm has the same purpose as the Proof-of-Work, but the process to reach
the goal is quite different. In Proof-of-Stake, the creator of a new block is
chosen depending on their wealth, also defined as stake. There is no block
reward so the miners, now called forgers, only earn from transaction fees.
Thanks to PoS, validators do not have to use a lot of computing power because
the only factors that influence their chances are the total number of their own
coins and current complexity of the network. The security of the system is
based on the fact that if a validator creates an invalid block, their security
deposit will be deleted as well as their privilege to be part of the consensus
network.
Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) protocols are a subcategory of the
basic Proof-of-Stake protocols, typically used in consortium blockchain systems.
In these protocols, blocks are minted by a predetermined set of users of the
system called delegates, who are rewarded for their duty and are punished
for malicious behaviour (such as participation in double-spending attacks). In
DPoS algorithms, delegates participate in two separate processes: (i) building
a block of transactions, (ii) verifying the validity of the generated block by
digitally signing it. While a block is created by a single user, it typically
needs to be signed by more than one delegate to be considered valid. The
list of users eligible for signing blocks changes periodically using predefined rules.
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In Proof-of-Authority-based (PoA) networks, transactions and blocks
are validated by approved accounts, known as validators.[1] PoA is comparable
to a “Proof of Stake model that leverages identity as the form of stake
rather than actually staking tokens”.34 Validators run software allowing
them to put transactions in blocks. The process is automated and does not
require validators to be constantly monitoring their computers. However, it
does require maintaining the computer (the authority node) uncompromised.
With PoA, individuals earn the right to become validators, so there is an
incentive to retain the position that they have gained. By attaching a
reputation to identity, validators are incentivized to uphold the transaction
process, as they do not wish to have their identities attached to a negative
reputation. PoA is suited for both private and public networks. The term
was coined by Gavin Wood, co-founder of Ethereum and Parity Technologies.[2]
In summary, PoW is based on the computing power of the participants, PoS
on the wealth of the participants, and PoA on the reputation of the participants.
34https://blockonomi.com/proof-of-authority/
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